The US and Iran: the logic of deterrence

The standoff between the US and Iran has lasted for decades and flares up periodically, yet no large direct war has happened so far. Why? The answer comes not from headlines but from the old logic of deterrence.

Deterrence works when both sides judge the cost of a direct clash to be higher than any possible gain. The classic example is the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: two superpowers came to the edge and stepped back precisely because the cost was clear to both. Sanctions, proxy conflicts, pinpoint strikes — these are ways to press without crossing the threshold beyond which everyone loses.

Hence the scenarios: a continued “managed hostility” without a big war, a risky escalation from miscalculation (war more often starts by mistake than by plan), or a détente through a deal when both sides find profit in a pause. History knows all three.

My opinion: the most dangerous moment is not when the sides are strong, but when one of them feels cornered; desperation breaks calculation. This is a judgment, not a forecast. But it explains why wise diplomacy always leaves the opponent an exit, not only an ultimatum.